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Abstract 
In southern Africa, the connections between climate and the water-energy-food nexus are strong. Physical and 
socioeconomic exposure to climate is high in many areas and in crucial economic sectors. Spatial 
interdependence is also high, driven for example, by the regional extent of many climate anomalies and river 
basins and aquifers that span national boundaries. There is now strong evidence of the effects of individual 
climate anomalies, but associations between national rainfall and Gross Domestic Product and crop production 
remain relatively weak. The majority of climate models project decreases in annual precipitation for southern 
Africa, typically by as much as 20% by the 2080s. Impact models suggest these changes would propagate into 
reduced water availability and crop yields. Recognition of spatial and sectoral interdependencies should inform 
policies, institutions and investments for enhancing water, energy and food security. Three key political and 
economic instruments could be strengthened for this purpose; the Southern African Development Community, 
the Southern African Power Pool, and trade of agricultural products amounting to significant transfers of 
embedded water.  
 
 
Introduction 
Numerous challenges coalesce to make southern Africa emblematic of the connections between 
climate and the water-energy-food nexus which has important economic influence throughout the 
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region. Physical and socioeconomic exposure to climate is high in socioeconomically vulnerable areas 
and crucial sectors, such as agriculture, but also in energy generation and mining. For example, almost 
100% of electricity production in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, and 
Zambia is from hydropower. Hydropower further comprises a major component of regional energy 
security through extensive sharing as part of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). The region’s 
population is concentrated in areas exposed to high levels of hydro-meteorological variability1 and is 
projected to roughly double by 20502. Of the thirteen mainland countries and Madagascar (Table 1) that 
comprise the Southern African Development Community (SADC), six are defined as low income, three 
as lower-middle income and four as upper-middle income, according to the World Bank Classification 
(using 2012 GNI per capita). There are few quantified examples of the linkages between climate and 
economic activity in the region, though South Africa experienced a decrease in GDP in the 1983 El Niño 
year3 and economic modelling studies in Malawi and Zambia indicate that the severe 1992 drought 
caused an approximately 7-9% drop in GDP and adversely affected household poverty4. Climate 
variability has important consequences for resource management in the region including for non-
equilibrium production systems such as rangeland ecology5, irrigation6 and lakes7. Hence, southern 
Africa is a region where seasonal climate forecasts have potential benefit in areas where sustained 
forecast skill is demonstrated. Seasonal climate forecasting has been the subject of many studies in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)8,9; and the Southern African Regional Outlook Forum (SARCOF) provides 
advance information about the likely character of seasonal climate. Yet, despite over a decade of 
research on hydrological applications of seasonal forecasts there is limited evidence of their operational 
use in the water sector9. With ongoing climate change, annual precipitation, soil moisture and runoff are 
likely to decrease, while rising temperatures could increase evaporative demand in large parts of the 
region10 (Figure 1).  
The last decade saw rapid growth in research and policy interest in natural resource scarcity, with 
water-energy-food interdependencies increasingly framed as a nexus, or resource trilemma. The Bonn 
Nexus conference in 201111 is notable in this process of recognising the complex interactions between 
sectors and resource systems and the need to minimise the trade-offs and risks of adverse cross-
sectoral impacts11,12. The nexus is increasingly prominent on policy-makers’ agendas, partly in relation 
to the post-2015 development agenda for the Sustainable Development Goals13. The private sector was 
another early promoter of the nexus concept14 due to growing associated risks affecting production 
security along supply chains, such as (but not exclusively) for water15. In southern Africa, for example, 
South African Brewers SABMiller are seeking better approaches to handling trade-offs between water, 
energy and food by attempting to make business decisions through a resource nexus lens16. Strong 
interdependencies at a range of scales give rise to a large number of trade-offs and co-benefits, 
according to the heterogeneous configurations of societal uses of water across river basins and 
aquifers. The region’s many transboundary basins require that actions among upstream and 
downstream water uses are reconciled between countries. 
Previous nexus studies have concentrated on global interdependencies17, problem framing18 or case 
studies of specific systems such as islands19 and irrigation and hydropower production20. Here, we 
examine southern Africa’s nexus from the perspective of climate and modify Hoff’s nexus framework11 
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which integrates global trends (drivers) with fields of action, to highlight the role of climate as a driver in 
southern Africa’s nexus (Figure 2). Climate encompasses average (i.e. 30-year) conditions, variability 
over years to decades (i.e. as observed) and anthropogenic climate change. In terms of the nexus, we 
consider the main elements of intra-regional linkages in water-energy-food at a national level, while 
highlighting connections at the river basin scale and drawing attention to case studies of the many 
examples of specific trade-offs and synergies21. We base our review on published studies, 
complemented by empirical analysis of available national-level data on climate, water resources, crop 
production, trade and GDP. We first consider national-level exposure of water, energy and food 
production to climate variability in aggregate economic terms and analyse the relationship between 
inter-annual and multi-year climate variability and economic activity, focusing on GDP and agricultural 
production. We then outline the potential for seasonal climate forecasting in areas with high forecasting 
skill and socially and economically important nexus related activities, and summarise studies that model 
the impact of anthropogenic climate change on elements of the nexus. Finally, we describe three key 
intra-regional mechanisms for balancing nexus components and conclude by identifying knowledge 
gaps in southern Africa’s climate and water-energy-food nexus. 
 
National level exposure of nexus sectors to climate 
We characterise exposure as the interaction between characteristics of the climate system (particularly 
inter-annual rainfall variability) and a country’s dependence on climate-sensitive economic activities 
such as the share of agriculture in GDP, the proportion of rain-fed agricultural land and the energy 
contribution from hydroelectric sources (Table 1, Figure 3). South Africa’s GDP is larger than that of the 
other 12 southern African economies combined. The direct contribution of agriculture to the economy is 
lowest (<10%) in South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia, Angola and Lesotho, 13% in Zimbabwe, 
and over 20% in the other countries. If agricultural processing were included in agricultural GDP, the 
shares would be substantially larger in most, if not all, SADC countries. The share of cropland equipped 
for irrigation is low in most of the region, with the exception of Madagascar, South Africa and Swaziland 
(Table 1). The contribution of hydropower to energy production is very high overall (Figure 3), but varies 
considerably across the region, from 1.5% in South Africa, to over 30% in Madagascar, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe, and to almost 100% in DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, and Zambia. Reliable electricity production is 
at risk during prolonged droughts, and also during extreme flood events, when dam safety is an 
additional risk. Over 90% of South Africa's energy generation is coal-based22, well above the rest of the 
region. Coal-fired power plants with wet cooling systems consume far more water than most other 
energy technologies22. Thus, South Africa’s main energy utility Eskom uses about 2% of the country’s 
freshwater resources, mainly for coal-fired power stations23. Coal mining and energy generation from 
coal both substantially impact water quality and availability24. To reduce these impacts, Eskom has 
implemented a dry-cooling system in two existing and all new power stations25, enabling a 15-fold 
reduction in water use.  
Overall, there are strong contrasts (Table 1) in energy (8-84% of energy consumption imported) and 
food (5-90% of cereal food imported) self-sufficiency, and in the intensity of freshwater use, expressed 
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as freshwater withdrawals relative to total actual renewable water resources (TARWR) (0.1-24%). 
Countries facing most water shortage, expressed as share of TARWR withdrawn (Table 1), are South 
Africa (24%), Swaziland (23%), and Zimbabwe (21%), well within categories defined as physically 
water-scarce (ratio larger than 20%26). We interpret this indicator with caution, noting its failure to 
capture the complex spatial and temporal distribution of water, political-economic access, differences in 
water needs and socioeconomic capacity to support effective water utilisation27,28. Sub-national areas of 
high demand relative to availability include southern Malawi, Namibia and Botswana. Low ratios of 
water withdrawal to TARWR (such as 0.05% in DRC28) could also indicate economic water scarcity due 
to inadequate investments to harness and deliver water. 
The cereal import dependency ratio (Table 1) reflects the importance of imports in the volume of grains 
available for consumption in the country (i.e. Production + Imports - Exports). It is particularly high for 
the small countries of Swaziland and Lesotho, and more strikingly so for larger nations like Botswana 
(90%), Namibia (65%) and Angola (55%). Dependency ratios are lowest in Zambia and Malawi. Total 
food aid received by the region (260,000 tons in 2012, Figure S1) was equivalent to about 2-3% of food 
imported by the region from the rest of the world (9 million tons in 2008). Thus, chronic and episodic 
food insecurity remain important problems in the region. The causes are multiple and, at the household 
and individual level, are dominated by poverty, environmental stressors and conflict, often underpinned 
by structural elements in the lives of communities, intensified by sudden shocks which can be climate 
related such as decrease in cereal availability and food price spikes29,30.    
 
Climate signals in nexus sectors 
Multi-year rainfall variability in southern Africa is higher than in many other parts of the world31,32. Inter-
annual variability, expressed as the coefficient of variation (CoV), is not particularly high at national 
scales: < 20% for most countries, except for the driest two countries Botswana and Namibia (Figure 3). 
However, rainfall displays much greater local variability (local CoV exceeds 20% across much of the 
SADC region), strong seasonality, and a range of multi-annual to decadal variations33. At the national 
level, long-term trends in rainfall between 1901 and 2012 are modest (the linear trend is insignificant 
relative to the long-term average) without evidence of any clear spatial pattern (Table S1). Linear trends 
during the last two decades show varied behaviour; three countries with wetting trends above 20% of 
the long-term mean annual rainfall (Botswana, Namibia and Zambia) and Tanzania with a drying trend 
of 21% (Table S1). National level analysis is likely to obscure local trends and the results are highly 
sensitive to the period chosen for analysis, particularly in regions with strong multi-annual variability. 
National variations in rainfall and temperature have been found to exert major influence on agricultural 
production in all of SSA, but with considerable regional heterogeneity in the response to rainfall34. 
Another study for SSA used panel regressions to explore the effects of temperature and precipitation 
variability on country level economic growth indicators and found drought was the most significant 
climate influence on GDP per capita growth35. We use correlation analysis to explore, for each country, 
the associations between annual rainfall and national economic activity (GDP annual growth rate) and 
agricultural production (all cereals and maize - the most significant crop in the region). Fifteen year 
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sliding correlations are used to examine the temporal stability of associations between variables (see SI 
Methods and data). There are no statistically significant relationships between annual rainfall and GDP 
growth rate (Table S2). Correlation of rainfall with total production of cereals and maize shows three 
countries with significant relationships at the 1% level and three at the 5% level (although for DRC, it is 
negative and possibly spurious). The average sliding correlations are somewhat higher (Table S3).  
Time series data of hydropower production are not publically available and not easily comparable 
between sites/countries, making it difficult to assess the importance of climate variability as a driver of 
energy production fluctuations. A study of the effects of modified reservoir operation to enhance 
downstream environmental flows of the Zambezi shows considerable variability in observed hydropower 
production at three sites, but does not consider the role of climate36. Electricity insecurity is known to 
negatively affect total factor productivity and labour productivity of small and medium-sized enterprises 
but the relationship is as yet not straightforward, with differences between countries and measurement 
effects37. Studies of specific events highlight major consequences of drought-induced reductions in 
electricity production38. Ref. 18 cites examples of drought impact on the Kariba Dam (Zambezi basin), 
during 1991-92, resulting in an estimated $102 million reduction in GDP and $36 million reduction in 
export earnings; and Kenya where, during 2000, a 25% reduction in hydropower capacity resulted in an 
estimated 1.5% reduction in GDP. A review of the economics of climate change in Tanzania profiled the 
consequences of the 2003 drought, which brought the Mtera dam reservoir levels close to the minimum 
required for electricity generation39. This prompted Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) to 
approach a private provider to use gas turbine units at huge cost. A more recent World Bank estimate 
put costs of power shortages in Tanzania at $1.7 million per day with an average 63 days a year with 
power outages39.  
 
Early warnings from the climate system  
Given the linkages between climate and the water-energy-food nexus in the region, seasonal forecast 
information can play an important role in guiding nexus-related decision-making, depending on forecast 
skill and utility. Seasonal to inter-annual variability in southern Africa is high, but so is its predictability 
relative to other regions, depending on location, time of year40 and phase of the El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation41 (ENSO). This can be seen by considering the association (Figure 4a) between Nino3.4 sea 
surface temperatures (SST) - as a representation of ENSO - and gridded rainfall over southern Africa 
south of 15°S42. A state-of-the-art coupled ocean-atmosphere model has some skill in predicting 
seasonal (December to February, DJF) rainfall over the region at a 1-month lead-time (DJF forecasts 
produced in November, Figure 4b shows areas with statistically significant correlation41, see SI Methods 
and data). Stronger ENSO associations and the best model performance are found for maximum 
temperatures (Figure S2). The areas where ENSO impacts significantly and where forecast skill levels 
are relatively high include the river basins of the Limpopo, Orange, Umgeni and lower Zambezi.  
The Limpopo basin is particularly notable as having both high economic productivity and strong ENSO 
associations and forecast skill. Comprising 408,800km2, and including the countries of South Africa, 
Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the Limpopo basin is one of the most water stressed in sub-
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Saharan Africa, and features some of the largest urban conglomerations (including Pretoria, 
Johannesburg, Gaborone, Francistown and Bulawayo). Irrigation comprises more than 50% of basin 
water use and other infrastructure (including industry and mining) is also highly dependent on basin 
water. There are significant mining activities in the basin, particularly in South Africa and Zimbabwe42, 
that generate major water pollution downstream43. The Limpopo is heavily regulated, with extensive 
plans for further development. 
Despite forecast skill and potential utility in economic productivity hotspots such as the Limpopo basin, 
a comprehensive review of seasonal forecasting status in SSA identified persistent barriers in realizing 
the benefits of forecast products, which were generally insufficient to inform response actions, such as 
production decisions and institutional actions44. If these barriers can be overcome, seasonal forecasting 
has the potential to contribute to anticipating fluctuations in nexus sectors and could inform guidance on 
reservoir multi-use, water allocation, early targeting of or access to agricultural inputs and credit, design 
of interventions during food crises, and improvements to trade and agricultural insurance45.   
 
Modelling nexus sectors in a changing climate  
The challenges for the water-energy-food nexus posed by inter-annual variability occur in the context of 
a gradually changing climate. Even if an international agreement to limit global warming to 2°C above 
pre-industrial conditions is successfully developed, climate models project significant changes that 
exceed the range of natural climate variability (Figure 1). According to the majority of climate models, 
most southern African countries warm more than the global-mean, with annual-mean temperatures 
rising by 2 to 3°C in most cases. Precipitation changes are more uncertain, with both increases and 
decreases possible. Nevertheless, for most countries the majority of models project decreases in 
annual precipitation, typically by as much as 20% though more for some models and countries. Except 
for the southernmost countries, there is a tendency for models that warm most to simulate stronger 
reductions in precipitation. Analysis of extreme precipitation in the climate models used for IPCC AR4 
shows a marked delay in rainy season onset over most of the region and an early end to the season in 
parts of the region46. 
Most nexus studies for southern Africa have been motivated by climate change and assess biophysical 
impacts for specific sectors, e.g., rainfall and irrigation water availability on crop production, or river flow 
changes on hydropower generation. Some crop models simulate sizable yield losses for southern 
Africa47, suggesting the region’s food system could be particularly vulnerable to climate change48. 
However, differences in climate scenarios, impact models, spatial and temporal scales and processes 
represented, restrict our ability to reliably define impacts for specific sectors and, importantly, secondary 
effects across the water-energy-food nexus. Nevertheless, an estimate of the range of potential impacts 
on maize yield (and the wide uncertainty range) can be determined from the 30-member ensemble of 
global gridded crop models run by the ISI-MIP programme49 (see SI). The simulated maize yield 
averaged across southern Africa decreases by 15.7±16.3% (rain-fed) and 8.3±20.4% (irrigated) by the 
2080s relative to the 2000s, i.e. a median yield reduction with a substantial range of different outcomes. 
The wide range is due to climate uncertainties and uncertainties in our understanding of crop response 
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to climate change, particularly the role of elevated atmospheric CO2 concentration on photosynthesis. 
Median impacts in the top five southern African producers are relatively small in the 2020s and 2050s, 
becoming more substantially negative by the 2080s, with a stronger level of agreement in the sign of 
change among simulations (Figure 5). Among these countries, rain-fed cultivation is most negatively 
impacted, highlighting that water stress is an important limiting factor to crop yield in the region. 
Average crop water use decreases, resulting in a 5.9±20.7% increase in estimated crop water 
productivity (see SI and Figure S3) by the 2080s.  
An ensemble of global hydrological models driven by five climate scenarios from the CMIP5 programme 
shows reductions in annual discharge from 0 to 50% for the multi-model mean across much of southern 
Africa, excluding Southwest Botswana50. River basin and water management models indicate higher 
risks for Zambezi hydropower generation51; while regional and global water and food models suggest 
lower runoff raises risks for water and food security in southern Africa in general52.  
The economic dimensions of the nexus in southern Africa can be studied using general equilibrium 
models that translate biophysical impacts into economic outcomes. This approach simulates economies 
as adapting to shocks, albeit imperfectly, through market and resource adjustments. Incorporating 
economic adaptation generally leads to smaller impacts than those from biophysical studies. Since 
global models rarely separate southern Africa from SSA, country-level studies are the region’s main 
evidence base. Historical climate variability imposes high costs on low-income agrarian economies53 
and climate change is likely to have adverse effects on food security54. Long-term change in annual 
precipitation and temperature may impact less than historical variability until 205055;4. Historical data 
show substantial variability in smallholder farm yields and incomes. Increase in future variability of 
smallholder farm yields from climate change is therefore likely to increase the livelihood and food 
insecurity risks for farmers who are already at high risk54. Although most studies focus on agriculture, 
this is not always the main climate impact channel. For example, nexus studies find that road damages 
from flooding and weather stress are equally or more important drivers of the economic losses 
associated with climate change in Mozambique and South Africa56. More integrated multi-
sector/country-level studies are needed to guide adaptation responses. 
A second strand of economic research focuses on climate and energy policy. A high proportion of 
SADC greenhouse gas emissions are from South Africa due especially to its reliance on coal-fired 
power. Curbing these emissions may reduce national income and employment, because financing 
domestic renewable options requires higher electricity tariffs57; 58. Lifting South Africa’s restrictions on 
hydropower imports would reduce investment costs and economic losses59. Climate change will have 
considerable indirect impacts on electricity generation with positive feedbacks. Higher water and air 
temperatures make cooling processes in coal-fired power plants less effective and potentially reduce 
water availability during longer dry periods24; this could result in an overall reduction of power plant 
efficiency and higher carbon emissions. Within its climate change strategy, Eskom aspires to diversify 
its energy generation mix to lower carbon-emitting technologies60. Solar photovoltaic and wind energy 
are considered to be the most viable renewable options in terms of water withdrawal and consumption 
compared with biofuel and hydropower25. Biofuels may reduce the region’s imported fossil fuels and 
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reduce rural poverty, but have potential food security trade-offs61. The research indicates that continued 
climate change, economic development and urbanization will strengthen inter-dependencies in the 
water, energy and food nexus in southern Africa and that climate and associated energy policy will 
further reinforce the costs of trade-offs and complementarities across the nexus, especially so if 
expansionist regional hydropower and biofuel strategies are adopted. 
 
Intra-regional instruments for the water, energy and food nexus 
Southern Africa can be characterised as a single economic block of strongly interlinked economies 
where water, energy and food flow between producers and consumers, while also displaying 
considerable heterogeneity in its natural resource endowments and infrastructure distribution, its socio-
political cohesion and its economic development. For both the region and individual nations, this implies 
significant challenges in attempting to balance supply and demand while maintaining coherent policies 
towards integrated management of water-energy-food resources. The region is well placed to transfer 
resources intra-regionally to meet energy and food shortfalls. However, rising demand for electricity, 
food and water throughout southern Africa may sharpen the region’s sensitivity to climate-induced 
shocks. Fifteen trans-boundary river basins transect the region, including the large Congo and Zambezi 
basins, shared by nine and eight countries, respectively, as well as many smaller shared catchments. 
Surface catchments are underlain by an estimated 16 trans-boundary aquifers62. The origin of the 
southern African economic block can be tied to the dominant position of South Africa and its history 
alongside other ex-South African and British colonies such as Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Botswana, 
Namibia and Zambia. South Africa in particular has great cultural, economic and political influence over 
its neighbours making its role as a source (and sometimes a sink) of energy, water, and food 
hegemonic63. This alliance and influence is also evidenced via the SAPP (South Africa has 77% of 
SAPP’s installed power supply capacity64), the SADC and other agreements.  
In responding to the distribution of and demand for water-energy-food resources, three key instruments 
have emerged. First, the SADC, based in Botswana, addresses how member countries sharing rivers 
might resolve water allocation priorities through a Protocol on Shared Watercourses65; 66. The presence 
of significant water demands arising from irrigated agriculture and the Gauteng urban industrial complex 
in South Africa has led to relatively sophisticated water sharing agreements such as the Joint 
Development and Utilization of the Water Resources of Komati River Basin67 and the Lesotho 
Highlands Development Project. Large-scale dams and inter-basin, often trans-boundary, transfers (ref. 
68 reports 27 existing ones)68 form part of national water-energy-food security strategies. South Africa 
and Zimbabwe, which have the largest numbers of dams, use these predominantly for irrigation and 
water supply, whilst Mozambique, which has one of the largest total dam capacities, concentrates on 
hydropower production (Table S4). Notwithstanding these institutional and physical structures, in some 
instances water sharing still suffers from a lack of institutional integration (particularly between 
agricultural and water institutions) and incomplete efforts to increase stakeholder participation and 
decentralise water management (ref. 69; reviewing South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique)69. 
Coordination during flood events can also be challenging. For example, the persistent 2010/11 summer 
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rainfall in the Zambezi basin resulted in high water levels of Lake Kariba. Opening of spillway gates 
raised downstream water levels which increased flooding and compromised effective reservoir 
management at Cahora Bassa further downstream in Mozambique70.  
Second, the SAPP is a remarkable alliance of 12 energy-generating bodies from 12 countries inter-
connected through a grid to help smooth spatial and temporal shortfalls in electrical capacity. It was 
established in 1995 by the member governments of SADC (excluding Mauritius) to develop an 
interconnected electrical system, coordinate and enforce common regional standards, harmonise 
relationships, develop expertise across member utilities, and promote sustainable development71. The 
SAPP electricity generating mix in 2012-13 was 54,923 MW, comprising a significant proportion from 
hydropower (17.4%), but dominated by coal (72.9%). The network is intended to function as a 
competitive market in which surpluses and deficits are resolved via trades and negotiations and 
therefore has potential to serve as a buffering mechanism for climate-induced river basin scale 
electricity insecurity. 
Third, food trade in southern Africa naturally results from regional variability in production, especially of 
maize. Large and efficient producers in South Africa induce a trade surplus with other SADC members. 
Importantly, trade of agricultural products corresponds to significant transfers of embedded water 
resources, or “virtual water trade” (VWT, see SI Data and Methods). Water resources embedded in 
South Africa’s and Zamia’s regional food exports (0.9 and 1.2 km3 in 2011, respectively, Figure 6a)72 
account for two thirds of the total intra-regional flow (3.2 km3). The dominant link is from Zambia to 
Zimbabwe, with a volume of 0.8 km3/y of virtual water, followed by Mozambique to Malawi and South 
Africa to Zimbabwe (both 0.5 km3/y). Zimbabwe is the region’s major virtual water importer in 2011, 
importing 2.0 km3/y from other southern African nations. Considering all international food trade, 
southern Africa is largely a net importer of virtual water. Indeed, international imports from outside the 
region (10 million tons of food, or 20.5 km3 of virtual water) dominate the VWT flows of southern Africa 
(27.9 km3/y, Figure 6b). In return, smaller volumes to outside the region are exported mainly from South 
Africa (3.2 km3/y). Most of South African virtual water exports via food are embedded in maize, of which 
less than 10% is irrigation (blue) water (0.066 km3). This represents almost all of the intra-regional blue 
VWT (0.067 km3)73. This small percentage reflects the dominance of rain fed (green water) agriculture in 
the region. Although strong open trade is an important tool to alleviate climate-induced food deficits74, 75, 
and virtual water trade openness tends to reduce undernourishment76, southern African countries have 
varying levels of trade connectivity and trade link strengths, both for intra- and extra-regional food trade 
links. Thus, the potential benefits of food trade to alleviate production shocks are likely uneven across 
the region, and require further investigation. 
One of SADC’s main goals for regional integration is to promote trade across member countries. Efforts 
are ongoing to reduce major existing barriers, such as trade regulations and lack of reliable 
transportation infrastructure79, notably via the Protocol on Trade80, including facilitation of customs 
processes, and a regional infrastructure plan for the transport sector81. SADC is currently exploring 
opportunities for greater cross-sectoral coordination in the SADC Climate Change and Green Economy 
strategy (under revision at time of writing82) in which key recommendations focus on implementations 
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that will ensure actions do not take place in a single directorate. Such recommendations have arguably 
comprised the most demanding area of work for the strategy development, reflecting the importance of 
ensuring cross-sectoral coordination, as well as finding agreement on how to achieve it at the regional 
scale.  
 
Conclusion and outlook 
Climate plays an important role in determining medium-term water availability, potential agricultural 
production, and some components of energy production and demand. Climate variability drives 
fluctuations in WEF elements with secondary effects across the whole nexus (Figure 1). Exposure to 
climate variability and climate change are high across nexus sectors that include substantial areas of 
economic activity in southern Africa and there is strong evidence of the effects of individual climate 
events. For example, South Africa experienced a 7% drop in GDP in the 1983 El Niño year, and climatic 
fluctuations resulted in GDP variations of up to US $5 billion3. The 2000 floods in Mozambique led to 
devastating impacts on livelihoods, electricity supplies and basic infrastructure83. Yet our analysis of 
associations between rainfall, GDP and crop production using available data shows mostly weak and 
statistically insignificant correlations, in contrast to other studies for SSA based on panel regressions 
(Brown, Barrios). This is likely to be partly a function of scale, where national and annual scales obscure 
stronger relationships that may exist at finer levels of analysis. Data availability (e.g. absence of 
publically available hydropower production time series) and quality also play a role. The country climate 
estimates are often based on sparse station coverage, particularly since the 1980s84 and recent scrutiny 
of GDP data for SSA has highlighted lack of transparency in data sources and collection methods, lack 
of metadata and lack of detail on methods of aggregation85. This leads to differences between GDP 
estimates, non-random errors, adjustments to historical data, and inhomogeneity in time series. 
National statistical offices are woefully under-resourced in SSA, while the need for good quality data is 
paramount and urgent; to underpin reliable physical and economic modelling and detailed narrative of 
the causal linkages between climate and nexus sectors86. 
River flows in the region are strongly linked to seasonal rainfall and temperature variations, and the 
information reviewed here provides evidence that seasonal forecasting of river flows in some basins has 
application potential. However, the benefits from seasonal forecasting for reducing net food and energy 
imports through enhanced agricultural and hydropower production/energy mix have yet to be studied 
and, even more importantly, implemented in practice. For the future, climate models show fairly strong 
agreement that the southern countries in the region may become drier and the secondary impacts, 
though very uncertain, are likely to be substantial across the water-energy-food nexus.  
Water, energy and food are linked across different scales in southern Africa. Spatial interdependence is 
high and climate anomalies can produce regional scale effects, for example ENSO related droughts and 
river basin scale floods. At the national level, water and energy are closely coupled through significant 
hydropower production in several countries. Water use for biofuels and cooling for electricity generation 
remains relatively modest except for cooling in South Africa. In South Africa policies rarely cross 
sectoral boundaries of water and energy at all governance levels, yet integration of renewable 
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technologies for pumping and heating has potential to benefit mitigation and achieve expenditure 
savings21. Water and food linkages are strong, primarily through green water requirements in rain-fed 
agriculture and some hotspots of irrigation (blue) water demand, which account for most freshwater 
consumption in the region. Food and energy linkages are growing due to increasing irrigation, 
mechanisation, and fertilization of agriculture, while biofuel development remains low. The rapidly 
growing demand for energy by industry and mining, rapidly growing urban areas, and agricultural 
intensification are likely to impose increasing strain on the water-food-energy nexus. At the regional 
level, nexus interdependencies are strong, due to multiple shared major river basins and aquifers, the 
SAPP power-sharing infrastructure, and intra-regional food and embedded water trade. These linkages 
are enhanced by governance mechanisms such as the SADC, which has established protocols on 
shared water, energy, and food security, a regional seasonal climate forecasting forum (SARCOF) and 
initiatives on trade and the green economy.  
Debate is ongoing about whether there is anything new about the nexus that distinguishes it from earlier 
integrative framings87; 88. Some argue that a nexus framing is better at uncovering more effective 
approaches and methods for cross-sectoral integration by examining trade-offs and co-benefits, and 
through linking disparate knowledge sets and improving governance89. However, entrenched vertically 
structured government departments and sector-based structures of agencies, policies and regulatory 
mechanisms complicate coordination and remain challenges to cross-sectoral integration87-89. The 
political economy of governance and operation is further challenged by regional and intra-regional 
institutional capacity and power imbalances. Our review suggests that climate change, combined with 
increasing demand associated with wider socioeconomic development pathways, will intensify 
interdependencies in the WEF nexus, particularly shorter-term pressures associated with extreme 
events. We have outlined some of the main interdependencies and key regional institutional and policy 
structures in southern Africa. There is a need to map these structures at finer scales, to understand and 
share insights where trends and shocks have been managed effectively in the past, and to identify 
measures that enhance successful cross-sectoral approaches. There are some efforts in regional 
strategy and policy formulation to better achieve cross-sectoral coordination, but the modalities for 
achieving such coordination are still under debate. In a highly climate-sensitive environment such as 
southern Africa, emerging strategies - such as those under SADC - will only bear fruit if recognition of 
co-dependencies and inter-relationships in the nexus provides the basis for credible and well-monitored 
actions. 
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Main Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Average annual total precipitation (1961-1990) and multi-model ensembles of projected 
changes in national-average annual precipitation (y-axis, pre, as a fraction of 1961–1990 mean) and 
national-average annual-mean temperature (x-axis, tmp, °C change from 1961–1990 mean), estimated 
for a global warming of 2 °C using a pattern-scaling approach90.  The three ensembles are CMIP3 (21 
models: open colored symbols and pink shaded distribution), CMIP5 (20 models: filled colored symbols 
and brown shaded distribution) and QUMP (17 versions of the HadCM3 model with perturbed physical 
parameter values: black symbols and blue shaded distribution).  The shaded distributions are fit to the 
data to represent the bivariate ±2 standard deviation ranges and have been included to facilitate 
comparison of the model ensembles rather than to represent probabilistic projections of climate.  Black 
dots and black fitted distributions illustrate the ranges of internal variability of 30-year mean climate 
simulated in a 1000-year control simulation of HadCM3, for comparison with the projected changes in 
climate. 
 
Figure 2: Modified version of nexus framework of Hoff11 integrating global drivers with fields of action, to 
illustrate the main timescales of climate as a driver in southern Africa. 
 
Figure 3: National rainfall variability and socio-economic exposure to hydro-climate; a – c individual 
countries, d: Average, minimum and maximum of 13 countries. Sources: Rainfall interannual variability 
(CoV,%), [84]; Hydropower share in energy production (%), [91]; Agriculture (crop & livestock 
production, forestry, hunting, and fishing) value added share of GDP (%), [91]. Note: missing data for 
agricultural GDP in Malawi. 
 
Figure 4: Kendall's tau correlations a) between concurrent DJF Nino3.4 SST and DJF rainfall for the 30 
years from 1982/83 to 2011/12; and b) between ECHAM4.5-MOM3-DC2 downscaled seasonal 
forecasts for DJF produced in November and observed DJF rainfall (Source: ref. 41). Correlations 
significant at the 95% level are shaded. See SI Methods and data. 
 
Figure 5: Simulated climate change impacts on rain-fed and irrigated maize yield in the top-five 
producing countries of southern Africa for the near, medium and long-time horizon under RCP 8.5. The 
bottom and top of the box are lower and upper quartiles, respectively; the band near the middle of the 
box is the median value across each set of simulations, which comprises an ensemble of 30 impact 
simulations (see ref. 49). 
 
Figure 6: Water resources transfers (km3) through food trade (a) among southern African nations (b) 
and with the rest of the world (RoW) in 2007. Ribbon colors indicate the country of export.  Sources: 
trade data [92], hydrology with H08 global model [93-94], in ref. 72. 
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Country  
GDP 
(10^9 
current 
US$) 
 
GDP per 
capita 
(current 
US$) 
Energy 
imports (% 
consumption)
Freshwater 
withdrawal (% 
total actual 
renewable water 
resources)  
Cereal import 
dependency 
ratio (%) 
Area 
equipped 
for irrigation 
(% 
cultivated 
land)  
 Economy Economy 
Energy self-
sufficiency 
Water 
Sustainability 
Food self-
sufficiency Water-food 
Angola 115 5,540 32 0.48 55 2 
Botswana 14.5 7,250 63 1.6 90 1 
DRC 18 420 5 0.05 37 0.1 
Lesotho 2.3 1,130 * 1.4 85 1 
Madagascar 10 440 * 4.9 10 31 
Malawi 4.2 270 * 7.9 6 2 
Mozambique 14.4 570 21 0.4 31 3 
Namibia 13.4 5,930 84 1.6 65 1 
South Africa 382 7,310 46 24 19 13 
Swaziland 4.1 3,290 * 23 79 26 
Tanzania 28 610 13 5.4 13 2 
Zambia 20.6 1,460 14 1.5 5 6 
Zimbabwe 12.5 910 10 21 52 5 
*Data unavailable 
Table 1: Economic indicators and climate sensitive economic activities across water, energy and food. 
Sources: GDP (2012), [91]; Energy (2012), [95]; Water use (2000-2005), [72,96]; Food trade (2007-
2009), [92], Irrigation (1960-2005), [72,96].  
 
 


A B
DC
ba
DRC Mozambique Tanzania Zimbabwe
? 8
0
? 6
0
? 4
0
? 2
0
0
2 0
4 0
Rainfed 2020 Rainfed 2050 Rainfed 2080
Irrigated 2020 Irrigated 2050 Irrigated 2080
?
Y i
e l d
 ( %
 r e
l a t
i v e
 t o
 2
0 0
0 )
South
Africa
An
go
la
Botswana
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
Malawi
M
ozam
bique
N
am
ib
ia
Zimb
abwe
South Africa
Swaziland
Ta
nz
an
ia
DR
C
Zam
bia
a
Angola Bo
ts
w
an
a
Le
so
th
o
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
M
ala
wi
Mo
za
mb
iqu
e
Na
mib
ia
Zim
babwe
So
ut
h A
fri
ca
SwazilandTanzania
DRC
Zambia
Re
st
 o
f
b
Le
so
th
o
0.81
0.5
0
0.50
0.3
6
0.2
0
0.
16
11.7
3.2
1.7
1.7
2.6
th
e 
W
or
ld
